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Abstract. Recently, Hwang and Shi proposed an efficient proxy signature scheme without using
one-way hash functions. In their scheme, an original signer needn’t send a proxy certificate to a
proxy signer through secure channels. However, there are two public key substitution methods that
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can be used to attack their scheme. In this article, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to the
public key substitution attacks.
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1. Introduction
In 1996, Mambo, Usuda, and Okamoto first proposed a new category of signature scheme, called proxy
signatures [7]. The proxy signature scheme allows a designed person, called a proxy signer, to sign on
behalf of an original signer. Later, a number of various proxy signature schemes have been proposed
[1, 5, 6, 9, 10]. Most of these schemes need one-way hash functions and secure channels to enhance their
security.
Recently, Hwang and Shi proposed a new proxy signature scheme without using one-way hash func-
tions [4]. In their scheme, an original signer needn’t send a proxy certificate to a proxy signer through
secure channels. However, there are two public key substitution attacks in Hwang-Shi’s scheme. One is
that the original signer can forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of the proxy signer. The other is that
an attacker can forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer.
2. The Review Of The Hwang-Shi Proxy Signature Scheme
There are three public large prime numbers in Hwang-Shi’s scheme [4]: P , Q, and P ′. Q is a factor of
P − 1 and P ′ > Q. The public parameter g is a generator with order Q in ZP and public parameter α
is a primitive root in ZP . We assume that Alice is an original signer and Bob is a proxy signer in this
article. Alice and Bob have their secret key xA ∈ ZQ and xB ∈ ZQ, and the corresponding public key
yA = g
xA mod P and yB = gxB mod P , respectively. The steps of Hwang-Shi’s scheme are briefly
reviewed as follows.
1. Alice computes r′ = gk mod P , where k is a random integer in ZQ. Next, Alice sends Bob
(w, r′), where w is the warrant of the delegation.
2. Bob computes r = gar′ mod P and r′′ = yaA mod P , where a is a random integer in ZQ. Next,
Bob sends Alice r′′.
3. Alice computes r = (r′′)xA−1r′ mod P , W = (αw mod P ′) mod Q, and s′ = (k+WrxA) mod
Q. Alice sends s′ to Bob.
4. Bob computes W = (αw mod P ′) mod Q and checks the validity of s′ by the equation gs′ ≡
r′(yA)
rW mod P . If it holds, he then computes the proxy secret key s = (s′ + a + rxB) mod Q.
5. Bob can sign a message M on behalf of Alice using the proxy secret key s. The proxy signature
on M is (w, r,M, Signs(M)).
6. A verifier can derive the corresponding proxy public key as follows.
gs ≡ r(yA)
rW yrB mod P, (1)
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where W = (αw mod P ′) mod Q. Then he/she uses the corresponding proxy public key gs to
verify the validity of Signs(M).
3. Cryptanalysis
In this section, we propose two public key substitution attacks to Hwang-Shi proxy signature scheme.
One is that the original signer, Alice, can forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of the proxy signer, Bob.
The other is that an attacker, Eric, can forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer Alice.
Attack 1:
The original signer, Alice, chooses two random integers k ′ and a′ in ZQ, and computes r = ga
′
mod P
and W = (αw mod P ′) mod Q. Then she updates her public key yA to y′A = y
−W−1
B g
k′ mod P . Next,
Alice computes a valid proxy secret key s′ = a′ + k′rW mod Q and uses s′ to forge a valid proxy
signature on behalf of Bob. A verifier can derive the corresponding proxy public key using Bob’s public
key, yB , in Equation (1). The correctness of this attack can be proven as follows.
gs
′
≡ r(y′A)
rW yrB mod P,
= ga
′
(y−W
−1
B g
k′)rW yrB mod P,
= ga
′
y−rB g
k′rW yrB mod P,
= ga
′+k′rW mod P. (2)
Attack 2:
An attacker, Eric, chooses two random integers k ′ and a′ in ZQ, and computes r = ga
′
mod P and W ′ =
(αw
′
mod P ′) mod Q, where w′ is a forged warrant of the delegation by Eric. Then he updates his public
key yE to y′E = y
−W ′
A g
k′ mod P . Next, Eric computes a valid proxy secret key s′ = a′ + k′r mod Q
and uses s′ to forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of Alice. A verifier can derive the corresponding
proxy public key using Alice’s public key, yA, in Equation (1). The correctness of this attack can be
proven as follows.
gs
′
≡ r(yA)
rW ′(y′E)
r mod P,
= ga
′
(yA)
rW ′(y−W
′
A g
k′)r mod P,
= ga
′+k′r mod P. (3)
4. Discussions and Conclusions
Although Hwang and Shi proposed an efficient proxy signature scheme without using one-way hash
functions, we have shown that their scheme is vulnerable to public key substitution attacks in the above
section. To withstand these attacks, we introduce two simple methods.
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In the first method, we modify the warrant w such that the warrant includes public keys of original
signer and proxy signer, and certificates of these public keys. The certificates are signed and issued by a
trusted certificate authority (CA) [2, 3, 8]. In the method, anyone cannot easily substitute his/her public
key and certificate unless he/she knows CA’s private key. This method is also without using one-way
hash functions. An original signer needn’t send a proxy certificate to a proxy signer through secure
channels as in Hwang-Shi’s scheme.
In the second method, we give a slight improvement of Hwang-Shi’s scheme as follows. We replace
the symbol W with e in all steps of Hwang-Shi’s scheme, where e = h(w, yA, yB) and h(·) is a public
one-way hash function. Although this method need to use a one-way hash function as [1, 5, 6, 9, 10], an
original signer needn’t send a proxy certificate to a proxy signer through secure channels as in Hwang-
Shi’s scheme.
Generally speaking, the warrant of the delegation w includes the original signer’s and proxy signer’s
ID, the delegation period, the signing capability of the proxy signer, and the restricting documents to be
signed [7]. In our first method, the warrant w additionally includes public keys of original signer and
proxy signer, and certificates of the public keys. In our second method, the warrant w is not changed.
The two improved schemes are more secure than Hwang-Shi’s scheme.
References
[1] Hwang, M. S., Lin, I. C. and Lu, Eric J. L.: “A secure nonrepudiable threshold proxy signature scheme with
known signers”, International Journal of Informatica, 11 (2), 2000, 1–8.
[2] Hwang, M. S.: “A new dynamic cryptographic key generation scheme in a hierarchy”, Nordic Journal of
Computing, 6 (4), 1999, 363–371.
[3] Hwang, M. S.: “An asymmetric cryptographic scheme for a totally-ordered hierarchy”, International Journal
of Computer Mathematics, 73, 2000, 463–468.
[4] Hwang, S. J. and Shi, C. H.: “A proxy signature scheme without using one-way hash functions”. Proceedings
of 2000 International Computer Symposium (ICS2000), Taiwan, 2000.
[5] Kim, S., Park, S. and Won, D.: “Proxy signatures, revisted”. ICICS’97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
1334, Springer-Verlag, 1997, 223–232.
[6] Lee, N. Y., Hwang, T. and Wang, C. H.: “On Zhang’s nonrepudiable proxy signature schemes”. Third Aus-
tralasian Conference (ACISP’98), 1998, 415–422.
[7] Mambo, M., Usuda, K. and Okamoto, E.: “Proxy signatures: Delegation of the power to sign messages”,
IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, E79-A (9), 1996, 1338–1354.
[8] Stallings, W.: Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice (2nd Edition, Prentice Hall
International, Inc., 1999.
[9] Sun, H. M.: “On proxy (multi-)signature schemes”. Proceedings of 2000 International Computer Symposium
(ICS2000), Taiwan, 2000.
[10] Yi, L., Bai, G. and Xiao, G.: “Proxy multi-signature scheme: A new type of proxy signature scheme”,
Electronics Letters, 36 (6), 2000, 527–528.

